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The intersubjectivist conception of autonomy:  
Axel Honneth’s Neo-Hegelian critique of liberalism
Abstract The paper reconstructs Axel Honneth’s Neo-Hegelian critique of the 
classical-liberal conception of autonomy and his articulation of an alternative 
view of personal autonomy as the property of certain types of intersubjective 
relations of recognition in modernity, developed most systematically in Honneth’s 
recent work Freedom’s Right (Das Recht der Freiheit). The analysis of Freedom’s 
Right focuses on reconstructing Honneth’s critique of the ‘negative’ and ‘reflex-
ive’ types of freedom (autonomy) articulated within the liberal tradition, and 
contrasting the former two with the conception of ‘social freedom’ (the inter-
subjectivist conception of autonomy) that Honneth formulates through a detailed 
‘normative reconstruction of modernity’. Finally, the paper considers the prox-
imity of Honneth’s ‘Hegelian liberalism’ to communitarianism. 
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Introduction: Axel Honneth’s Critique of the Classical Liberal 
Conception of Autonomy
In his recent works, Axel Honneth, the influential third-generation critical 
theorist and social philosopher, has described himself as a ‘Hegelian liberal’ 
(Honneth, 2011b). The central concern of Honneth’s works such as Suffer-
ing from Indeterminacy, Pathologies of Individual Freedom, and Freedom’s Right 
is the reappropriation of the mature Hegel’s philosophy of right, which aims 
at presenting a substantive ’Hegelian liberal’ theory of justice, methodolog-
ically grounded in what Honneth terms the ’normative reconstruction’ of 
modernity (Honneth, 2001, 2010, 2011a). This project is to a considerable 
extent underpinned by what Honneth understands as his critique of classical 
(individualist) variants of liberalism and an attempt to articulate an alterna-
tive conception of personal autonomy, grounded in the notion of an inter-
subjectively constituted ‘ethical life’. In this paper, I reconstruct the logic of 
Honneth’s Hegelian critique of the classical liberal conception of ‘negative 
freedom’ and the individualist understanding of autonomy as moral ‘self-de-
termination’ against the background of Honneth’s own intersubjectivist con-
ception of autonomy as ‘social freedom’.
As Bert van den Brink and David Owen note in Recognition and Power, ’with 
Kant, Habermas, and Rawls, Honneth shares a strong commitment to the 
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notion of the autonomy of the person understood as a source of justified 
social claims that are brought into practices of public moral reasoning’, but 
he criticizes these authors at the same time for developing their concepts 
of autonomy too narrowly, ’in abstraction from historical contexts of in-
stitutionalized ethical life’ (van den Brink and Owen, 2007: 7). As I will try 
to show, these contexts of ethical life are theorized by Honneth as specif-
ic institutionalized relations of symmetrical intersubjective recognition, which 
Honneth understands as the actual ‘media’ of personal autonomy – in other 
words, personal autonomy can only be meaningfully exercised within these 
intersubjective relations.
Honneth’s Conception of Democracy as ‘Reflexive Cooperation’
Honneth’s neo-Hegelian critique of classical liberalism also encompasses an 
articulation of a political ideal – a particular theorization of democracy – 
which combines Deweyan pragmatism with Honneth’s theory of recognition. 
For example, in ’Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation’, Honneth interprets 
John Dewey’s theory of democracy as arguing in favour of a social order of 
’cooperative self-realization’. Honneth distinguishes between two principal 
contemporary theories of radical democracy – republicanism and procedur-
alism – claiming that Dewey’s perspective differs from both conceptions, as 
it shifts the theoretical focus from ’communicative consultation’ to ’social 
cooperation’ (Honneth, 2007: 220). In contrast to Hannah Arendt, Dewey’s 
critique of the classical liberal perspective rests on a fundamental pragma-
tist conviction that ’communicative freedom’ is not embodied in linguistic 
interaction as such but in the ’communal (gemeinschaftlich) employment of 
individual forces to cope with given problems’ (ibid: 222). Honneth identifies 
the Deweyan idea of ’cooperative self-realization’, not only in Hegel’s theo-
ry of ethical life, but in the prominent representatives of the first- and sec-
ond-generation critical theory as well: ’the different models of practice that 
Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas offer are all only representatives of that 
one thought, according to which the socialization of human beings can only 
be successful under conditions of cooperative freedom’ (Honneth, 2009: 26). 
Dewey’s reflections provide Honneth with initial conceptual means for elab-
orating his ’formal concept of ethical life’ into an explicit political ideal. 
In ’Post-Traditional Communities’, for example, Honneth further builds on 
these arguments, claiming that ’the freedom of self-realization thus depends 
upon the existence of communities in which individuals value one anoth-
er in light of commonly shared goals’ (Honneth, 2007: 257). Democracy as 
reflexive cooperation requires the existence of a substantive ethical ’life-
world’ which is at the same time capable of accommodating the processes 
of legal universalization and cultural inclusion. However, it is only in his 
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reappropriation of the late Hegel’s philosophy of right, in works such as Suf-
fering from Indeterminacy and Freedom’s Right, that Honneth will substantially 
elaborate his political-theoretic position.
Individualism as ‘Moral Disorientation’
Honneth’s reconstructive efforts in Suffering from Indeterminacy are complex 
and detailed, but the main aim is to bring to attention Hegel’s argument that 
’abstract rights’ (negative freedom) and ’morality’ (freedom of choice between 
meaningful alternatives) are necessary but insufficient preconditions of hu-
man autonomy (Honneth, 2001). The subject’s ’abstract right’ to withdraw 
from any particular intersubjective commitment that is not legally binding is 
a necessary precondition of freedom, and so is the capacity for moral reflex-
ion which enables a subject to ’turn inwards’, and, weighing up the available 
arguments, decide for the best possible course of action. However, when most 
of the intersubjectively articulated action-guiding norms become problema-
tized in times of rapid social change (such as Hegel’s own time), the subject’s 
turning inward will easily lead her towards endless reflection and self-ex-
amination, resulting in an incapacity to act. In Hegel’s words, the individual 
will be ’suffering from indeterminacy’ – a state of moral disorientation that 
Hegel considers to be characteristic of his own time. 
The modern social actors’ preoccupation with abstract legal rights and moral 
autonomy have, according to Honneth, obscured the fact that our social re-
ality embodies exactly the ethical resources that we need in situations which 
demand complex normative judgement. In Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel, 
true moral reflexivity requires an individual to recognize that the norms which 
guide her action do not exist as pure ideas, but are present within the practical 
circumstances of her social existence. Hegel transforms his moral-philosoph-
ical account into a diagnosis of social pathologies (’indeterminacy’) by arguing 
that, as long as social actors are, so to say, ’bewitched’ by the argumentative 
force of negative freedom and the Kantian individualist conception of moral 
autonomy, society will remain in a state which resembles Durkheim’s concept 
of anomie. In Honneth’s understanding, social reality in Hegel’s perspective is 
not ’indifferent’ to the way subjects experience it (Honneth, 2001). 
As Honneth explains, Hegel’s fundamental normative and social-theoreti-
cal premise is that the institutional order of the modern (bourgeois) society 
already embodies a high degree of ’reason’, and that it provides the means 
for overcoming the individuals’ state of ’indeterminacy’. However, it is only 
in his recent Freedom’s Right that Honneth will elaborate the intersubjective 
nature of this societally embodied ‘reason’, in the form of specific norma-
tive claims that underpin social interaction in modern societal ‘sub-domains’ 
of the private sphere, the market economy and the political public sphere.
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Freedom’s Right: Personal Autonomy as the Property 
of Intersubjective Relations
Freedom’s Right is essentially an extensive elaboration of Honneth’s main line 
of argument developed in Suffering from Indeterminacy – the critique of the 
liberal concept of negative freedom and the Kantian notion of moral auton-
omy in favour of the Hegelian account of ’social freedom’. Honneth elabo-
rates his earlier Hegelian thesis, arguing that the greater part of everyday 
social interaction in modern societies consists of intersubjective relations 
of a ’substantive-ethical’ kind. Some types of these relationships – personal 
relationships, capitalist economy, the public sphere – possess the potential of 
providing social actors with an experience of ’social freedom’ (which I here 
interpret as an intersubjectivist conceptualization of personal autonomy), a 
potential that has been realized to a greater or lesser degree over the course of 
history. The two other forms of modern ’freedom’ within social reality – the 
’legal’ or ’negative’ freedom (absence of any form of coercion, often equated 
with ’freedom’ as such in everyday language) and the ’moral’ or ’reflexive’ type 
(most commonly associated with the Kantian notion of moral autonomy), 
Honneth argues, can only exist and have meaning against the background of 
what Honneth terms the cultural ’lifeworld’ of substantive-ethical relations. 
However, as Honneth suggests, these insufficient forms of human freedom 
are commonly mistaken for its ’totality’, and the realm of the cultural life-
world is generally treated as a realm of heteronomy, without any kind of 
emancipatory potential – this self-misunderstanding of modern social actors, 
according to Honneth, leads to certain forms of social pathologies1.
The main thrust of Honneth’s ’normative reconstruction’, in my understand-
ing, is the conceptualization of specific ’normative claims’ (Ansprüche) – the 
fundamental action-guiding principles that underpin the three spheres of 
social action – the private, the economic and the political – and constitute 
the essence of their ’freedom potential’, although the empirically existing 
spheres are otherwise shot through with relations of power, status subordi-
nation and economic exploitation. Honneth’s perspective here relies on an 
earlier definition of ’reconstructive social critique’ articulated in ’Ground-
ing Recognition’, where Honneth identifies a ’gap’ between the normative 
’potentiality’ and ’actuality’ of the institutionalized action-guiding principles 
in the mentioned spheres. (Honneth, 2002).
1  Max Pensky argues, for example, that these pathologies can be understood as ’problems 
of solidarity’: ’Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, as his mature theory of social solidarity, is crucial 
for Honneth’s project’, since ’it explores how an ethical conception of bourgeois civil so-
ciety – the modern condition of political existence – generates problems of solidarity that 
at least for Hegel cannot be solved at the level of civil society itself’ (Pensky, 2011:130).
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According to Honneth’s critique, liberal political philosophy has ’severed’ the 
theorization of normative principles from the analysis of social reality, so that 
the former occurs in abstraction from empirical reality (Honneth, 2011: 14). 
Hegel’s philosophy of right provides an alternative model: it formulates a the-
ory of justice through the analysis of the actual, empirical ’ethical life’ of mod-
ern societies, and reconstructs the normative-theoretical principles of justice 
on the basis of the existing normative claims that frame social interaction.
One of Honneth’s foundational theoretical premises in Freedom’s Right is that 
the notions of justice and freedom have become completely interimbricated 
over the course of modernity. In other words, all contemporary conceptu-
al variations of ’justice’ and the ’just society’ crystallize themselves around 
one core idea – that of individual freedom, or personal autonomy (Honneth, 
2011: 35). In the manner of Charles Taylor’s hermeneutics of modernity, 
Honneth argues that the fusion of the discourses of justice and freedom has 
occured gradually, over the course of the last several centuries, and that the 
concept of personal autonomy has exerted a tremendous ’gravitational force’ 
with respect to all other concerns of moral-philosophical thinking (ibid: 36). 
The concept of equality, Honneth suggests, is actually a dependent variable 
– it is merely the means for attaining the fundamental end of freedom, in 
the sense that only an egalitarian social order can provide the institution-
al framework that safeguards everyone’s autonomy. Honneth thus becomes 
able to draw a line of continuity between two forms of normative theory – the 
’formal’ and ’substantive’ moral-philosophical standpoints. 
Honneth’s argument attempts to erase the ’unbridgeable chasm’ between 
those theoretical standpoints concerned with protecting the irreducible plu-
ralism of moral worldviews, on the one hand (all variants of liberalism), 
and those that put forward a substantive ’vision of the good life’, i.e. social 
order that enables the ’flourishing’ of all its subjects, on the other (various 
forms of ‘perfectionism’). Honneth argues that within every modern theory 
of justice, freedom is the telos of justice, regardless of how both are concep-
tualized. The argument that Honneth develops might be represented by the 
following scheme:
Justice <–> Freedom <–> Self-Realization
The concept of freedom in Honneth’s perspective is synonymous with per-
sonal autonomy, and it mediates between the two opposing paradigms, as 
they had, for example, been conceptualized by Nancy Fraser in her critique 
of Honneth, and enables him to draw a line of continuity. Honneth also 
makes one crucial ontological claim: that freedom is essentially a property of 
intersubjective social action, not a state of an individual self understood in ab-
stracto, or the absence of undesirable circumstances. This argument enables 
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Honneth to claim that there is no categorial difference between those con-
ceptualizations of freedom which are considered ’formal’ in the above men-
tioned sense (e.g. liberal ’negative’ freedom), and those which treat freedom 
as a state of individual self-fullfillment. 
The ’potentiality of freedom’ – the insufficiency of the legal  
and moral forms of autonomy
These theoretical moves prepare the ground for Honneth’s central argument 
that the Hegelian conception of freedom has significant advantages over the 
liberal and proceduralist standpoints. The normative-reconstructive enter-
prise that Honneth subsequently embarks upon should demonstrate that the 
negative and reflexive types of freedom, although indispensable for modern 
autonomous life, ensure a mere ’possibility’ of living autonomously, where-
as the thick interactive webs of ’ethical life’ found in informal personal re-
lationships, the economy and the political public sphere are the ’reality’ of 
freedom in which social actors can, so to say, immerse themselves – they are 
the ’stuff’ of which autonomous life is actually made. 
The first two types of freedom are ’parasitic upon’ the latter, as they only 
enable a social subject to temporarily withdraw from the immediacy of the 
everyday webs of interaction, and to reflect upon her position within them 
– her particular choices and commitments – with the possibility of chang-
ing it. The crux of Hegel’s argument that Honneth takes over is that the ex-
perience of personal freedom is best described as the feeling of ’being at one 
with oneself in another’ (’bei sich Selbst sein im Anderen’); in other words, 
the situation in which the pursuit of our own ’purposes’ is facilitated, rather 
than obstructed, by the other actors’ pursuit of theirs, and vice versa (Hon-
neth, 2011a: 113-114). In the language of Hegelian recognition theory, the 
experience of freedom is the equivalent of the interactive partners’ mutual 
recognition of their capability to facilitate each other’s self-realization within 
the institutionalized realms of social interaction. 
The Hegelian concept of freedom, according to Honneth, is more compre-
hensive and more empirically adequate than the rival concepts of negative 
and reflexive freedom, and it is more intuitively plausible to us than the lib-
eral and Kantian conceptualizations. As Honneth argues in a crucial para-
graph of the book:
Hegel’s idea of social freedom possesses a higher degree of correspondence 
with the pre-theoretical intuitions and social experiences than other mod-
ern representations of freedom. For socialized subjects, it must be a kind 
of self-understandable fact that the degree of their individual freedom de-
pends on how responsive their contexts of action are with respect to their 
goals and intentions: the stronger their impression that their purposes are 
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supported, even carried forth, by those with whom they regularly interact, 
the more they will come to see their social environment as the space within 
which their self constantly expands (Honneth, 2011a: 113, my translation). 
It is highly questionable, in my opinion, whether this notion of freedom is 
intuitively closer to ordinary social actors than the classical liberal and Kan-
tian conceptualizations. Charles Taylor’s hermeneutical analysis, for exam-
ple, would rather suggest that we have ’learned’, over the course of moder-
nity, to think of freedom and autonomy primarily in terms of the liberal 
conception, as the property of an individual subject (Taylor, 2001). However, 
there is some degree of plausibility to Honneth’s claim that it is impossible 
to theoretically exhaust the meaning of ’freedom’ in all its empirical mani-
festations by defining it as a state-sanctioned, legally guaranteed set of rights 
that prevent coercion and remove particular obstacles to action. 
Honneth argues that the greater part of what we consider to be ’individual 
freedom’ in contemporary societies does not come in the shape of legally 
codified rights, but is a property of a ’network of weakly institutionalized 
practices and customs, which give us a feeling of social confirmation or of 
a possibility to express ourselves freely’ (Honneth, 2011a: 126, my transla-
tion). Although Honneth does not use recognition-theoretic language in this 
instance, he later clarifies that intersubjective relations within the ethical 
lifeworld are in fact relations of mutual recognition, those of the recipro-
cal confirmation of the actors’ emotional needs, moral autonomy and their 
valuable roles within the process of social reproduction.
There is, according to Honneth, a strong tendency in contemporary societies 
to overlook the fact that our experience of freedom has a multi-faceted nature, 
and to reduce it, both in theories of justice and in public discourses of justi-
fication, to the realm of state-sanctioned rights. This reduction is the source 
of a number of social pathologies that Honneth subsequently discusses in his 
analysis of legal and moral freedom. As Honneth argues, a social pathology 
consists in the ’curtailing [Beeinträchtigung] of the social actors’ rational ca-
pacities of taking part in diversified forms of social cooperation’ (Honneth, 
2011a: 157, my translation). The key of the definition is the adjective ’rational’: 
according to Honneth, pathology differs from injustice in that it manifests it-
self as a ’reflexivity’ disorder (or ’second-order disorder’) – a situation in which 
some or most social actors are no longer able to comprehend the full mean-
ing of the ’primary action- and value-systems’ of a given social order (ibid). 
Honneth’s conceptualizations of ’legal’ and ’moral’ freedom, taken togeth-
er, constitute the realm of the ’possibility’, or ’potentiality’ (Möglichkeit) of 
freedom, which only has meaning against the background of freedom’s ’ac-
tuality’ (Wirklichkeit), embodied in the three mentioned spheres of modern 
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ethical life. Let us first take a look at the most basic precondition of personal 
autonomy - the liberal concept of negative freedom. The realm of state-sanc-
tioned rights that protects the individuals’ freedom from coercion plays the 
role of providing the individuals with a ’space for the exploration of their 
penchants, preferences and intentions’ (Honneth, 2011a: 129, my transla-
tion). The two fundamental instances of legal freedom are the right to form 
contracts and the right to private property. In line with Honneth’s understand-
ing of freedom as a quality of intersubjective relations, the realm of ’subjec-
tive rights’ is a particular ’sphere of action’.
There is a fundamental contradiction within this sphere of action in Hon-
neth’s view, since legal subjects can only enjoy their right to negative free-
dom in privacy, as atomized individuals, while, on the other hand, they can 
only come to understand themselves as authors of these same rights in terms 
of a collective of citizens engaged in democratic will-formation. The ’nega-
tive’ and political-cooperative dimensons are both constituents of the legally 
guaranteed freedom, but they establish two qualitatively different spheres of 
action. The tension between the private and the collective autonomy ’runs 
through the centre of the legal subject’, as Honneth puts it (Honneth, 2011a: 
144, my translation).
The first, negativist meaning of legal freedom is purely procedural, while 
the second, cooperative one requires the actors to internalize an entire cul-
tural pattern of democratic civic activism. In other words, it requires the 
existence of a certain form of ethical life, without which the actors would 
have no motivation to engage in collective will-formation in the first place 
(Honneth, 2011a: 130-131). The full exercise of personal autonomy within 
the action sphere of legal rights is, according to Honneth, only possible if 
an entire realm of social freedom, in the form of a ’democratic ethical life’ is 
already in place (ibid: 119). Even the negative dimension of legal feedom is 
premised upon the existence of a differentiated ethical lifeworld. Echoing 
John Stuart Mill’s argument, Honneth points out that without the rich va-
riety of ethical worldviews which stand at the disposal of social actors, not 
only would there be little motivation for political action, but the process of 
ethical self-questioning, safeguarded by the liberal right of freedom from 
coercion, would hardly be possible at all. 
In light of these arguments, Honneth further clarifies that the ’social’ rights 
of the modern democratic welfare state should be understood in terms of 
the state providing social actors with the material foundation for effective 
exercise of personal autonomy – in other words, these rights are there to 
enable the realization of the mere ’potentiality’ of negative freedom (Hon-
neth, 2011a: 142). Honneth argues that any attempt at shrinking the volume 
of social rights guaranteed by the state or rendering them conditional upon 
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the ’good conduct’ of the subjects destroys their fundamental meaning of the 
’guarantors’ of autonomy that every citizen is entitled to (ibid: 142-143). This 
argument, in my opinion, helps Honneth fend off the widespread criticism 
that he is a ’culturalist’ concerned only with the symbolic preconditions of 
successful identity formation (e.g. McNay, 2008; Fraser and Honneth, 2003; 
Alexander and Lara, 1996)2.
As Honneth argues, modern developed societies are witnessing cases of a 
social pathology related to the sphere of legal freedom – social actors are in-
creasingly prone to ’forgetting’ the limitations and the particular role of legal 
freedom, and mistaking this particular type of freedom for its totality. Since 
Honneth explains social pathology as the reduction of the actors’ multi-fac-
eted capacities for rational action, the result of the above process is not a 
’deformation’ of the individual character, but an ’impoverishment’ and ’ri-
gidification’ of social interaction and the actors’ self-relation. The absoluti-
zation of legal freedom involves an excessive juridification of interpersonal 
relationships (Honneth, 2011: 162a). Echoing Habermas’ argument that ju-
ridification is an instance of the systemic colonization of the lifeworld, Hon-
neth argues that the individuals engaged in social interaction within such 
’ethical’ spheres as the family, education system, and the realm of cultural 
production in contemporary societies are ever more inclined to act exclu-
sively as rights-bearers. 
The Limits of the Kantian Conception of Moral Freedom
Unlike the sphere of legally guaranteed subjective rights, stepping into the 
realm of moral freedom does not require the actors to abstract from the 
wealth of their and their interactive partners’ particularities. Moral free-
dom could be seen as the second step towards personal autonomy in Hon-
neth’s perspective: while the sphere of legal rights establishes a kind of firm 
outer boundary that protects a space of individual normative self-reflection 
from outside interventions, moral freedom represents the actual ’set of tools’ 
with which the reflective process is carried out. However, moral freedom 
does not itself provide the material of reflection, which consists of substan-
tive-ethical components.
The Kantian conception of reflexive freedom is centred around the argu-
ment that personal self-determination should have the form of ’self-legis-
lation’ (Selbstgesetzgebung), a practice which requires the actor to submit 
2  In the rejoinder to his commentators in Axel Honneth: Critical Essays, Honneth most 
concisely defines his political position as Hegelian liberal’: ’I, too, am convinced that the 
theory of recognition results in a “Hegelian” expansion of liberalism, which consists in 
adding social conditions of autonomy to the catalogue of rights that ensure autonomy’ 
(Honneth, 2011b: 414). 
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her inherited moral worldviews and guidelines of action to the test of uni-
versalizability, and then reappropriate or discard them. 
However, there is more to Kant’s conception of moral freedom than the 
mere reconsideration of pre-given, internalized and inherited ethical de-
terminations, as Honneth points out. The essence of reflexive freedom, in 
the Kantian sense of self-legislation, is the imperative that we arrange our 
whole lives, the entire network of our action-orientations, according to the 
reflexively appropriated universalist moral norms (Honneth, 2011a: 182). 
In other words, self-legislation does not only consist in applying the test of 
universalizability to particular situations, but requires one to define one’s 
entire being through a form of acting consistently, and to gradually actual-
ize one’s normative self-image in the complexes of social action, ’expressing 
in practice what kind of person one wants to be’ (ibid: 184, my translation). 
Moreover, this is not an a priori defined process, as the actor actually learns 
and decides upon what kind of moral subject she wants to be over the course 
of countless particular situations. 
As in the case of negative freedom, there are strong tendencies in contempo-
rary societies, according to Honneth, to hypostatize reflexive freedom as the 
totality of personal autonomy. The exercise of moral autonomy, like that of 
legal freedom, presupposes the successful formation of a specific type of so-
cial subject – the ’moral personality’ – through the process of  socialization. 
In order to act as a morally autonomous subject, one has to abstract, not from 
the entire complex of one’s ethical self, but from all the convictions and re-
lationships that cannot pass the test of normative universalization – in other 
words, one has to abstract from the normative ’situatedness’ of one’s ethical 
self. As Honneth explains, we as moral actors are required to think and be-
have as if we did not already share with our interactive partners a ’particular 
pre-understanding regarding the institutional facts and norms’ of our cultural 
context, in other words, as if our interlocutors were virtually ’understanding’ 
and ’consenting to’ our arguments in a cultural vacuum (Honneth, 2011a: 196).
This is another way for Honneth to point out that reflexive freedom, just as 
its legal variety, only makes sense within a context of ethical life. Moral reflec-
tion always happens within an ethical lifeworld, and it is supposed to help us 
find our way in the complexities of everyday interaction and become what we 
might call ’autonomous citizens’ of such a lifeworld, not help us ’emancipate’ 
ourselves from it. Moreover, moral autonomy in the form of self-legislation 
is not antithetical to the world of concrete social roles and ethical bonds3. 
3  This can also be understood in the sense that ’we become autonomous only through 
being taken care of within an autonomy-supporting culture’, as Antti Kauppinen has 
argued (Kauppinen, 2011: 296).
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The mentioned pathology of reflexive freedom results from the actors’ in-
ability to understand its limits and proper place, as outlined above. This 
means that the actors succumb to the seductive image of moral autonomy as 
completely sovereign individual self-legislation conducted in an ahistorical 
and context-insensitive manner. The actors then begin to lose from sight the 
fact that their everyday interactive contexts are already ’shot through’ with 
moral reason to some extent.
The ’actuality of freedom’: privacy, economy and democratic  
will-formation as spheres of social freedom 
In light of the above considerations, one might say that the negative and re-
flexive types of freedom are there to provide social actors with the right to 
temporarily ’free themselves’ from ’social freedom’ itself. When we exercise 
negative and reflexive freedom, we do so in everyday interactive situations 
which require us to ascribe certain capacities to our interlocutors and vice 
versa. What, then, is the qualitative difference between acts of recognition 
within the first two forms of practicing personal autonomy, and those per-
taining to the third one, without which, according to Honneth, the former 
would in fact be meaningless?
The Hegelian argument implies that freedom consists in an experience of 
’being at one with oneself in another’, i.e. the realization that the pursuit of 
one’s goals in life is not only compatible with, but that it facilitates the self-re-
alization of one’s interactive partners, and is in turn facilitated by it. The crux 
of this argument is an ontological claim that freedom equals a state of emo-
tional fulfilment that comes with intersubjective recognition. The principal 
difference between recognition in the spheres of legal and reflexive freedom, 
on the one hand, and in that of social freedom, on the other, is in the rela-
tionship between the act of recognition and the pursuit of the actors’ indi-
vidual goals. In the first two spheres, Honneth points out, recognition is only 
a precondition for the individual actors’ concrete pursuits. I cannot exercise 
my right to negative freedom or moral reflexivity if the others do not rec-
ognize me as a person capable of comprehending and acting upon the prin-
ciples that culturally constitute these types of freedom.
In the case of social freedom, embodied for example in relations of friend-
ship, recognition has a more constitutive role – one cannot pursue a course 
of action as a friend except with respect to another person who recognizes her 
as a friend. In other words, being recognized as a friend is intrinsic to the role 
of friend, i.e. to the very practice of social freedom. In the spheres of social 
freedom, recognition is an end in itself, an act that creates a nexus between 
two individuals in the form of a friendly relationship (Honneth, 2011a: 224-
5). Honneth argues that this form of intersubjective recognition is a ’moral’ 
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phenomenon because it requires us to approach the other subject as if we 
had already presumed the value of her strivings and goals of action and un-
derstood the role that our own acts will play in their realization. Only those 
domains of social interaction that are constituted on the basis of such in-
trinsic morality can be considered spheres of social freedom. This criterion 
enables Honneth to single out personal relationships, economic action and 
the political public sphere as dimensions of social freedom in contempo-
rary societies. These spheres, Honneth argues, are all characterized by the 
quality of ’complementary reciprocity’ (komplementäre Wechselseitigkeit) 
(Honneth, 2011a: 269). 
In Honneth’s perspective, personal relationships are the framework for giv-
ing and obtaining affective care, the realm of economy should enable the ac-
tors to obtain self-esteem, while the public sphere offers the necessary room 
for experiencing respect of one’s moral autonomy. The modern institution 
of ’romantic’, interset-free friendship that, according to Honneth, has no 
’historical precedent’ in pre-modern forms of friendship, is one such in-
stitution that ’actualizes’ the possibility of an anxiety-free expression and 
confirmation of one’s emotions in an interactive context (Honneth, 2011a: 
243). Modern friendship is a sphere of social freedom, Honneth argues, be-
cause it enables us to experience our feelings, impressions and intentions as 
’presentable’ and articulable. It offers us an experience of the ’setting free’ 
of our will in friendly interaction – this experience of free, relaxed ’self-ar-
ticulation’ constitutes the essence of modern friendship, as Honneth points 
out (Honneth, 2011a: 249).
A similar role, in Honneth’s understanding, is played by modern romantic 
love, a sphere of the ’free emotional interplay’ between individuals, which 
provides a qualitatively distinct kind of affective care and the possibility 
of ’expressing’ one’s emotional self (and thereby affirming its reality). The 
sphere of the modern nuclear family is the third dimension of social freedom 
within the realm of personal relationships. The normative transformation 
of the nuclear family, as Honneth points out, is closely intertwined with the 
evolution of intimate relationships, more precisely their internal ’emanci-
pation’ from economic and status imperatives over the course of modernity. 
The modern sphere of economic interaction (the capitalist market) is anoth-
er sphere of social freedom. Hegel, and later Durkheim, were, according to 
Honneth, among the rare theorists who were able to conceive of the new eco-
nomic sphere as the potential source of social solidarity through the actors’ 
experience of mutual interdependence. The crucial premise of both thinkers’ 
perspectives, in Honneth’s view, is that market interactions can only func-
tion smoothly if the actors do not treat each other merely as bearers of legal 
contract rights, but also recognize each other as ’members of a cooperative 
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collectivity’ (Honneth, 2011a: 329). These acts of recognition enable actors to 
begin experiencing ’solidarity’ and are in fact the precondition for the actors’ 
capacity to treat each other as legal persons – their existence thus implies 
that market economy can be theorized as a sphere of social freedom as well. 
The nexus of solidarity that is established between the actors engaged in 
economic interaction enables them to experience the market as a sphere of 
social freedom, since their actions possess the quality of ’complementary 
reciprocity’: the actors facilitate the fulfillment of each other’s material needs 
through acts of economic exchange (Honneth, 2011a: 348). Honneth argues 
that the sphere of economic action has, since the establishment of capital-
ism, possessed a ’normative surplus’, a promise of freedom that had to be 
’actualized’ through class struggle and other types of political conflict – this 
process, according to Honneth, is still far from completion.
In Honneth’s understanding, the democratic public sphere is a realm of social 
freedom par excellence – that is, if its potential could ever become fully actu-
alized (Honneth, 2011a: 470-71). Similar to the realm of economic action, 
this sphere might give us a false impression that it is constituted purely on 
the basis of legal and moral freedom, as the liberal and proceduralist stand-
points would have us believe. Honneth’s perspective, in contrast, stresses 
that a ’democratic ethical life’, a cultural pattern that teaches individuals to 
treat democratic will-formation as a worthwile activity, is the very core of 
the political public sphere. Echoing the earlier mentioned conceptualization 
of democracy as ‘reflexive cooperation’, Honneth argues that political rights 
cannot be understood in relation to an isolated individual, they are inher-
ently intersubjective in nature. Moreover, the public sphere should not be 
theorized in isolation from the previously analyzed ones of personal rela-
tionships and economic interaction. Whether or not this sphere of action 
stands up to its own potentiality of freedom depends, according to Honneth, 
on whether the debates within it are part of an overarching learning process 
that reinforces the struggles for the actualization of freedom in the other two 
spheres (Honneth, 2011a: 473).
Honneth bases his argument on the Durkheimian concept of ’constitutional 
patriotism’, which presumes the readiness of social actors to interiorize the 
communicative roles of ’speakers’ and ’hearers’, enabling them to recipro-
cally ’express’ their personal strivings and search for the best institutional 
framework to realize them (Honneth, 2011a: 500). Honneth points out that 
Durkheim’s perspective is close to that of John Dewey, who conceived of 
democracy as the ’governance of reflexivity’, a collective employment of the 
individual members’ intelligence in the solving of problems that constantly 
arise within everyday life (ibid: 504-5). 
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For this purpose, the institutionalization of a democratic public sphere on the 
basis of legal and reflexive freedom is insufficient. What is required in order 
to realize the potentiality of collective will-formation is a long series of social 
struggles to remove the substantive obstacles to deliberation – class domina-
tion, gender subordination and cultural hierarchies. This should eventual-
ly result in the formation of a ’class-transcending, all-encompassing realm 
of communication’, without which there can be no meaningful ’exchange of 
opinion’ between social groups (Honneth, 2011a: 540, my translation). Ac-
cording to his perspective, the normative conception of the state that can be 
’read out’ of modern Western history is the one of ’reflexive organ’, which 
the social actors engaged in democratic will-formation can use to practi-
cally implement their ’experimental’ solutions to crucial societal problems 
(Honneth, 2011a: 570). These experimental solutions can, for example, take 
the shape of policies that are implemented through state intervention in the 
economic sphere, which Honneth considers to be the precondition for trans-
forming the market economy into a domain of social freedom (ibid: 580).
The third, final precondition for transforming the public sphere into a realm 
of social freedom, as I already indicated, is the existence of a particular ’polit-
ical culture’ (Honneth, 2011a: 612). In Honneth’s view, democratic will-for-
mation is impossible without a degree of already actualized social freedom. 
Social actors must already be able, to a certain extent, to experience freedom 
in the realms of economic action and personal relationships, before they can 
begin to understand themselves as citizens of a democratic state. Honneth 
argues that the mentioned ’all-encompassing’ realm of communication can 
only be brought about by a kind of ’synergy’ between the struggles for rec-
ognition in all three spheres of (potential) social freedom – the private, the 
economic, and the political.
Concluding Remarks: Hegelian Liberalism 
and Communitarianism
As I tried to show, Honneth’s main criterion for evaluating the normative 
progress achieved within the three spheres of ’social freedom’ up to the pres-
ent is the extent to which social actors have actualized the normative po-
tential of ’complementary reciprocity’ (symmetrical recognition) that each 
of these spheres harbours. The essence of Honneth’s ‘Hegelian liberalism’ is 
the argument that it is only through participating in relations of symmetrical 
recognition within the three spheres of modern ethical life that social actors 
can actually experience personal autonomy in the full sense of the term – 
namely, they can experience ’social freedom’ as a sense of ‘complementary 
reciprocity’ that characterizes their intersubjective relations. As Antti Kaup-
pinen points out, Honneth’s argument can also be interpreted in a negative 
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sense – it is primarily when we experience a disruption in the normal func-
tioning of these intersubjective relations that we realize they are constitutive 
of our sense of personal autonomy:
Honneth’s methodological starting point is a solid Hegelian insight: the 
dependence of autonomy on social relationships is revealed when the dis-
ruption of those relationships leads to a reduction in one’s ability to make 
autonomous choices. The normally invisible intersubjective dependence 
manifests itself when there is a problem (Kauppinen, 2011: 267).
In Freedom’s Right, Honneth’s ‘Hegelian liberal’ perspective comes, in a nor-
mative-theoretical sense, considerably closer to communitarianism and the 
notion of ’situated criticism’ than in any of his previous works, since the po-
tential of ’complementary reciprocity’ that the modern societal spheres of 
intimacy, economy and politics possess is a thoroughly historical phenome-
non, whose origins can be located within the confines of Western modernity. 
Honneth effectively argues that, without being immersed in the universe of 
the historically evolved spheres of intersubjective ethical life, there isn’t much 
that the subject can reflect upon, and the liberal and Kantian conceptions of 
freedom seem rather useless. A similar point has been made by communi-
tarian political philosophers, notably Michael Walzer, who argues, in oppo-
sition to what he considers to be the ’postmodern’ visions of ’radical free-
dom’ as self-transformation, that the freedom to completely redefine oneself 
is meaningless unless it exists against the background of a complex web of 
already given cultural and ethical commitments (Walzer, 1983). 
However, the crucial difference with respect to communitarianism consists 
in the fact that, in Honneth’s perspective, the argument that the negative 
and reflexive types of freedom have little sense without pre-given commit-
ments that stem from traditional lifeworlds assumes a very specific meaning, 
since in Honneth’s view the ethical lifeworld, or, rather, the three spheres of 
symmetrical intersubjective recognition (the private, economic and public 
sphere) are the very medium of personal autonomy, not just the background 
against which it is exercised. 
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Marjan Ivković
Intersubjektivistička koncepcija autonomije:  
Honetova novohegelijanska kritika liberalizma
Apstrakt
u radu se rekonstruiše novohegelijanska kritika klasične liberalne koncepcije au-
tonomije u delu Aksela Honeta, kao i Honetova formulacija alternativnog shva-
tanja lične autonomije kao karakteristike određenih formi intersubjektivnog pri-
znanja, koja je najsistematičnije izložena u Pravu slobode (Das Recht der Freiheit). 
Analiza Prava slobode se fokusira na rekonstruisanje Honetove kritike koncepcija 
‘negativne’ i ‘refleksivne’ slobode (autonomije) artikulisanih u liberalnoj tradiciji, 
i kontrastira ove koncepcije sa pojmom ‘socijalne slobode’ (intersubjektivističke 
koncepcije autonomije) koji Honet artikuliše putem detaljne ‘normativne rekon-
strukcije modernosti’. Rad se naposletku osvrće na odnos Honetovog ‘hegelijan-
skog liberalizma’ i komunitarizma.
Ključne reči: Honet, liberalizam, autonomija, sloboda, intersubjektivnost, 
individualizam
